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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No.
14629

-vsGARY ALFRED MITCHESON,
Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with Murder in the Second
Degree in the shooting death of Richard Herrera at Price,
Utah, on February 7, 1976.
The case was tried in the District Court of
Carbon County, State of Utah, before the Honorable Edward
Sheya, sitting with a jury; on April 23, 1976 a verdict
of guilty of Murder in the Second Degree was returned
against the appellant.

From that verdict, appellant

appeals.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was sentenced to the Utah State
Prison to serve a term of five years to life by the
Honorable Edward Sheya.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the conviction was
proper and should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 15, 1975, Ernie Herrera, younger
brother of the shooting victim, Richard Herrera, sold
his 1967 Chevrolet Van to Alfred Mitcheson, father of
appellant Gary Mitcheson (T.11-12).

According to Ernie

Herrera, the mag wheels were not included in the sale,
the consideration for which was a reduction in the selling
price from $600.00 to $300.00; however, Ernie Herrera
agreed to loan the mag wheels to appellant for use on
the van.

The mag wheels were mounted on the Mitcheson

van the same day as the sale (T.12-13).
On several subsequent occasions in January
1976, Ernie Herrera requested that his mag wheels be
returned, but his requests were ignored (T.14).

Finally

Ernie Herrera, his brother Richard, and several friends
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appeared at the home of Alfred Mitcheson and began
removing the mag wheels from the van that Ernie
Herrera had sold to Mitcheson (T.22,219-220).

Officer

Tilton, responding to a call from Alfred Mitcheson,
arrived nt the Nitcheson home and ordered Ernie
Herrera, Richard Herrera, and their friends, Mike
Manzanares and Louis Grant, to put the wheels and
tires back on the van, suggesting that they go to
court to resolve any issue over the ownership of the
mag wheels and tires

(T.22, 219-222).

Late in the evening of February 6, 1976,
another confrontation took place at the Taco Time drivein in Price, Utah, during which the decedent struck
appellant (T.28,222-223).

After the participants

separated and left the drive-in, another meeting
occurred at the residence of Jerry Giraud approximately
two hours later.

Appellant, his sister, and several

ob~erved

Richard Herrera's car parked at the

friends

Giraud residence.

They parked their cars and appellant

told his sister Debbie to "go in and tell Richard if
he wanted to fight me, come outside and fight me."
(T.:25).

Eventually, appellant entered the Giraud

residence but the decedent refused to fight (T.226).
However, arrangements were made for the two to fight at
two o'clock that afternoon (T.226).
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Appellant and Wendell Johnson dropped off
their other friends in town; the two drove to Alfred
Mitcheson's home, where appellant picked up the
rifle with which Richard Herrera was to be shot.
Appellant told his father he was staying at Debbie's
house that night.

He drove back to town, met Albert

Dicaro, arranged for a card game at Debbie's house,
and arrived at his sister's house sometime after
2:00 a.m.

(T.227-228).
Meanwhile, the decedent, Richard Herrera,

gathered some of his friends to go to Debbie's
house and remove from the van the mag wheels and
tires which he claimed were his brother Ernie's
160-161, 167-168).

(T. 51,

At approximately 3:30 a.m. the

decedent and his several friends proceeded to the
house at 432 South Fourth East,
sister Debbie lived (T.161).

where appellant's

Before they could remove

the tires, Miss Mitcheson came out onto the lighteJ
front porch and ordered the group to get off her
property (T.162).

As Richard Herrera and his friends

stood in the front yard, appellant grabbed his rifle,
o;::"!ned the front door and fired his gnr, from the
doorway, instantly striking--Richard Herrera, who died
moments later from a gaping neck wound (T.162,258-259).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE
APPELLi'_c;T' s

REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTimr BASED ON THE

DEFENSE OF JUSTIFICATION.
Appellant, by his Requested Jury Instruction
No. 15, requested that the trial court present one
of the theories of his case, use of deadly force in
defense of his habitation, to the jury for its consideration.

The trial court refused to give the

requested instruction, and exception was taken by
defense

counsel (T.328).
The requested instruction was a verbatim

expression of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405, 1953, as
amended, which provides:
"A person is justified in using
force aaainst another when and to
the ext~nt th~: he reasonably believes
that the force is necessary to prevent
or terminate the other's unlawful
entry into or attack upon his habitation;
however, he is justified in the use
of force which is intended to cause
death or serious bodily injury only
if:
(1) the entry is made or attempted
in a violent and tumultuous manner
and he reasonably believes that the
entry is attempted or made for the
purpose of assaulting or offering
personal violence to any person, dwelling
or being therein and that the force is
necessary to prevent the assault or
offer of personal violence or;

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

(2)
He reasonably believes that
the entry is made or attempted for
the purpose of committing a felony
therein and that such force is
necessary to prevent the commission of
the felony."
Respondent acknowledges that under appropriate
ci.:.·..::ums"":ances, fai2..ure to give this inst:::-uction would
be reversible error, in accordance with the holdings
of the line of cases cited by appellant.

However,

the circumstances which would warrant such an instruction
are not present in the instant case.
According to State v. Newton, 105 Utah 561,
144 P.2d (1943), each party is entitled to have his
theory of the case which is supported by competent
evidence submitted to the jury.

In State v. Johnson,

112 Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738 (1947), this court held
that an appropriate instruction on a theory of the case
is required if there be any substantial evidence to
justify giving such an instruction.
case cited by appellant, State v.
2d 70, 457 P.2d 618

In the final

C~stillo,

23

U~ah

(1969), the court reaffirmed the

propriety of the substantial evidence test.
Under this standard the trial record needed
to contain substantial evidence which would tend to
put the events of the early hours of February 7th within
the parameters of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405, 1953, as
amended.

An analysis of the events as related to the
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statutes demonstrates clearly that justification in
defense of habitation was neither a viable nor a
supportable defense in the instant case.

Even if,

arguendo, this court accepted that for purposes of
thi3

st~tute,

appellant's habitation that evening was

his sister's home, although he was merely staying the
night, appellant could not surmount other obstacles:
1.

As the decedent and his friends were

huddled in the vicinity of the van in the yard of the
home, it was unreasonable for appellant to assume
that the home itself was about to be invaded.

What

was reasonable to assume was that the persons in
the yard had come to remove the mag wheels and tires,
as they had tried to do on a previous occasion.

No

violent overtures were made by any members of the
Herrera group toward the home or toward any of the
persons therein.
2.

Altho~~~ the Herrera grou? may 6ave been

trespassing on the Mitcheson property by refusing to
leave the yard, the record supplies no evidence to
meet the statute requirement that there be an unlawful
:oen+:ry into or attack upon t:te habitation.

The home and

not the yard was the habitation.

3.

Because deadly force was used, the statute

requires in those cases that the entry or attempted entry
be made in a "violent or tumultuous manner".

Again

appellant
offLibrary.
er no
evidence
toprovided
support
this of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored
by the S.J.could
Quinney Law
Funding
for digitization
by the Institute
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

theory since there was neither an entry nor an
attempted entry.
4.

In addition to the violent entry require-

ment, the statute further demands that such entry
be made or attemD::ed in order to physically harm persons
therein or to commit a felony within the habitation.
Although the decedent, Richard Herrera, had agreed
to fight the appellant later in the day, appellant
was unable to offer competent evidence that the
decedent was attempting to violently enter the
residence to harm anyone or to commit a felony
therein.

The attempted removal of the wheels and

tires from a van in the yard of the home would not
meet the statutory requirement of felony "therein".
In light of this analysis, respondent's
position is that appellant failed to meet the
substantial evidence standard by being outside
th2 parameters of Utai-1 Code Ann.

§

76-2-405, 1953,

as amended, making inapplicable and inappropriate
Prepared Jury Instruction No. 15.
Other jurisdictions have considered this
issue of presenting theories to the jury, and their
comments are helpful here.

In State v. Rio, 38 Wash.
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2d 446, 230 P.2d 308

(1951), the Supreme Court of

Washington held that the court is not required to
submit instructions to the jury on every theory
requested by a defendant; and although the court
will not pass on the weight or credibility of
defendant's evidence, assuming that it is all true,
defendant still must make a prima facie case as
a matter of law to entitle him to instructions

on the theory requested.

In the instant case, no

prima facie case was established.
In a 1974 Nevada case, Singleton v. State,
522 P.2d 1221, the court held that an instruction
need not be given where there is no proof in the
record to support it.
These decisions support the trial court's
refusal to include the justification instruction
in its

cl1~rge

~o

the jur?, as

th~re

'"73.S :10 competent,

substantial evidence tending to support that proposition.
CONCLUSION
Because appellant had failed to offer any
substantial evidence supporting his theory of justification in the defense of habitation, the trial
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court properly refused to give appellant's requested
Jury Instruction No. 15.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah

84114

Attorneys for Respondent
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